Showing posts with label Securitization. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Securitization. Show all posts

Friday, April 16, 2010

SEC vs. Goldman II

I was wrong and Goldman only acted as a middleman/broker in the transactions, they did not directly issue CDS and did not have positions in any of the transactions.

As I read more and more, it seems the SEC is really going to have a hard time proving anything. All Goldman did was find participants, they acted as a market-finder and had no skin in the game. Were they supposed to issue updates on what one of their customers, Paulson, was doing? Or basically say to the CDS issuer, "Hey, don't you know the great Paulson is on the other side of the trade? He's never wrong, and you're going to get taken!".


I think I understand the situation almost completely now. Paulson saw the crisis coming and wanted to bet against housing. But how? There isn't a subprime mortgage index or anything like that so he first had to create a reference index that he could bet against. That was the CDO made up of subprime loans rated Baa2 that he expected would be in trouble. So he asked Goldman to find someone who could act as an asset manager and structure such a CDO so that he could bet against it. Goldman did in ACA. ACA had all the information Paulson did on credit scores and so forth, and subsequent investors would also. After the CDO was structured, Paulson bought CDS on it and he turned out to be correct. Those issuing the CDS had the relevant information, that Paulson wanted to bet against this CDO all along wasn't relevant. It's like if I bought Goldman Sachs tomorrow and I didn't know George Soros was selling me his shares. So what? I'm buying because I see that the SEC has no case, who cares if Soros is selling?

If there is a culprit here, it is Paulson, not Goldman who only acted as broker. Still it is a stretch, Paulson didn't have any information that wasn't available to everyone else. He was just smarter and better.

Analysis of SEC's Case Against Goldman Sachs

Those who want to read the actual complaint made by the SEC should go here. After reading the complaint, the SEC's case can be split into two parts.

PART 1

Goldman mislead ACA, the third party picked to head selection of securities, that Paulson, a person also involved in the selection of securities to be included, would have skin in the game of the final CDO.

On January 10, 2007, Tourre sent an email to ACA with the subject line, “Transaction Summary.” The text of Tourre’s email began, “we wanted to summarize ACA’s proposed role as ‘Portfolio Selection Agent’ for the transaction that would be sponsored by Paulson (the ‘Transaction Sponsor’).” The email continued in relevant part, “[s]tarting portfolio would be ideally what the Transaction Sponsor shared, but there is flexibility aroundthe names.”

then


47.
On January 10, 2007, Tourre emailed ACA a “Transaction Summary” that included a description of Paulson as the “Transaction Sponsor” and referenced a “Contemplated Capital Structure” with a “[0]% - [9]%: pre-committed first loss” as part of the Paulson deal structure. The description of this [0]% - [9]% tranche at the bottom of the capital structure was consistent with the description of an equity tranche and ACA reasonably believed it to be a reference to the equity tranche. In fact, GS&Co never intended to market to anyone a “[0]% - [9]%” first loss equity tranche in this transaction



Considering that what Goldman described was a CONTEMPLATED capital structure, I think this alleged deception will be very hard for the SEC to prove. It's up to ACA to do due diligence as they were hired to do just that, act as a neutral third party analyst for the selection of securities to be included in the CDO.



Later on, ACA's parent company would write insurance on the CDO. The SEC claims that ACA wouldn't have done so if they knew that Paulson had gone short (bet against the CDO since he helped pick the underlying securities. However I think that's a very weak argument as ACA also helped pick and had ultimate say in that they could have refused to put their name on a CDO they didn't like.



61.
ACA’s parent company, ACA Capital Holdings, Inc. (“ACA Capital”), provided financial guaranty insurance on a variety of structured finance products including RMBS CDOs, through its wholly-owned subsidiary, ACA Financial Guaranty Corporation. On or about May 31, 2007, ACA Capital sold protection or “wrapped” the $909 million super senior tranche of ABACUS 2007-AC1, meaning that it assumed the credit risk associated with that portion of the capital structure via a CDS in exchange for premium payments of approximately 50 basis points per year.
62.
ACA Capital was unaware of Paulson’s short position in the transaction. It is unlikely that ACA Capital would have written protection on the super senior tranche if it had known that Paulson, which played an influential role in selecting the reference portfolio, had taken a significant short position instead of a long equity stake in ABACUS 2007-AC1.
63.
The super senior transaction with ACA Capital was intermediated by ABN AMRO Bank N.V. (“ABN”), which was one of the largest banks in Europe during the relevant period. This meant that, through a series of CDS between ABN and Goldman and between ABN and ACA that netted ABN premium payments of approximately 17 basis points per year, ABN assumed the credit risk associated with the super senior portion of ABACUS 2007AC1’s capital structure in the event ACA Capital was unable to pay.



Part 2

Goldman did not disclose to investors that the selection process involved Paulson who had a short position against some of the underlying securities or similar securities.


41.
On or about April 26, 2007, GS&Co finalized a 178-page offering memorandum for ABACUS 2007-AC1. The cover page of the offering memorandum included a description of ACA as “Portfolio Selection Agent.” The Transaction Overview, Summary and Portfolio Selection Agent sections of the memorandum all represented that the reference portfolio of RMBS had been selected by ACA. This document contained no mention of Paulson, its economic interests in the transaction, or its role in selecting the reference portfolio.


I think this is the only place where the SEC might have a case. But did Goldman have to disclose Paulson's role? After all, Paulson is just another client of the firm and so does it have to keep track of what each and every client is doing? What if Paulson had entered into short positions with another firm instead of Goldman, clearly then Goldman would not have known (but he didn't). It was known that the underlying securities would be based on subprime mortgages rated Baa2, does Goldman have to reveal that Paulson, who played a part in the selection of the particular mortgages, had a negative view of the mortgage market and bet against those securities?

In the end, a stupid German commercial bank, IKB, decided to purchase $150 million of the CDO in two tranches. They lost just about all of the $150 million while Paulson, who had purchased credit default swaps on the underlying securities, profited. The CDS was purchased through Goldman, which means that Goldman "lost" money as they had to pay out on the CDS. That will add complications to the SEC case, but the SEC claims that the money IKB lost went to Paulson which isn't directly true. IKB lost money through purchasing a CDO offered by Goldman. Paulson made a bet on securities that the CDO was based upon or similar securities and collected his insurance money from Goldman. Goldman "won" with IKB and "lost" with Paulson, it doesn't follow that IKB's money went to Paulson. We'll have to see what happens, but this is by no means an open and shut case.

SEC Has Weak Case Against Goldman

Today, the SEC filed civil charges against Goldman, a short summary from the NY Times reads,

Goldman Sachs, which emerged relatively unscathed from the financial crisis, was accused of securities fraud in a civil suit filed Friday by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which claims the bank created and sold a mortgage investment that was secretly devised to fail.




After reading more details of this transaction, I'm not sure if the SEC has a case or not. ACA knew that Paulson was involved with picking the securities, they exchanged e-mails with him and both negotiated over which securities would be included in the CDO.

On January 22, 2007, ACA sent an email to Tourre and others at GS&Co with the subject line, “Paulson Portfolio 1-22-10.xls.” The text of the email began, “Attached please find a worksheet with 86 sub-prime mortgage positions that we would recommend taking exposure to synthetically. Of the 123 names that were originally submitted to us for review, we have included only 55.”



It seems the whole SEC case hinges on the fact that Goldman did not disclose Paulson had purchased Credit Default Swaps (CDS) on some of the underlying securities from Goldman, and was involved with ACA in the initial selection process. However someone else on Felix Salmon's blog raised a really good issue,


“After participating in the selection of the reference portfolio, Paulson effectively shorted the RMBS portfolio it helped select by entering into credit default swaps (“CDS”) with GS&Co to buy protection on specific layers of the ABACUS 2007-AC1 capital structure.”

In other words Paulson bought insurance for the underlying portfolio from Goldman.

If the underlying portfolio fails–or if it were to fail–Goldman will have to post collateral.

If Goldman knew that these are bad securities (implying that at some point it has to post collateral to Paulson & Co.) then why would GS structure them in a way that Paulson wants?

Even if for some strange reason GS did structure it the way Paulson wanted and got a fee in return, how can GS be held culpable, given the fact it is long on the underlying insurance?"



This will be a very hard case and is not a clear case of wrongdoing. Goldman was not an underwriter, they were just the broker in the deal. There's no guarantee that anything a broker sells has to be a "good" security in the eyes of the broker or the seller. It's like a yard sale, the buyer knows that the stuff there is junk in the eyes of the seller, but one man's junk is another's treasure. In the financial world, no one is omniscient, Paulson turned out to be right, but ACA had the opportunity to review the proposed list of securities, made revisions, and agreed to the final list. They could have rejected any of the securities on the list, and in fact did reject 21 out of the initial list as well as pick the replacement securities. It was a negotiation and ACA is a big boy who should have done better analysis (actually it's really the willingness of subsequent investors to accept risk for such a low yield). The fact that these were to be based on subprime mortgages at the Baa2 credit level underscores that this wasn't going to be as safe as a government bond.


This occurred on February 2, 2007: “Later the same day, ACA emailed Paulson, Tourre, and others at GS&Co a list of 82 RMBS on which Paulson and ACA concurred, plus a list of 21 “replacement” RMBS. ACA sought Paulson’s approval of the revised list, asking, “Let me know if these work for you at the Baa2 level.”



The only fault I can see is that Goldman didn't correct ACA's false assumptions that Paulson was long in the fund.


On January 10, 2007, Tourre emailed ACA a “Transaction Summary” that included a description of Paulson as the “Transaction Sponsor” and referenced a “Contemplated Capital Structure” with a “[0]% – [9]%: pre-committed first loss” as part of the Paulson deal structure. The description of this [0]% – [9]% tranche at the bottom of the capital structure was consistent with the description of an equity tranche and ACA reasonably believed it to be a reference to the equity tranche. In fact, GS&Co never intended to market to anyone a “[0]% – [9]%” first loss equity tranche in this transaction…

On February 12, 2007, ACA’s Commitments Committee approved the firm’s participation in ABACUS as portfolio selection agent. The written approval memorandum described Paulson’s role as follows: “the hedge fund equity investor wanted to invest in the 0- 9% tranche of a static mezzanine ABS CDO backed 100% by subprime residential mortgage securities.”



All the instant analysis on the mainstream news sites don't do justice to the complexity of the issue. It's a good thing there are blogs out there that will provide real analysis from people who understand the business, but that's bad for the SEC as the deeper you look into the case, the worse it appears for the SEC.

Friday, April 10, 2009

Securitization and Conspiracies

What the financial system does is match savers with borrowers, that's all in the grand scheme of things. That simple task is actually quite hard, just as matching two people in search of love is very hard.

The point is that there is no conspiracy or Illuminati behind the scenes pulling strings. All the credit derivatives and other tools are there to help money from savers flow to borrowers. Of course each saver has his own risk tolerance and most people don't have the time to check out every potential borrower for credit worthiness. That's why we pool savings together into banks, who vet the borrowers, or purchase bonds through mutual funds who also do research.

Securitization splits risk into different sections so that money from low risk savers can still find its way to high risk borrowers. It is a tool and is incredibly useful. Before, a high risk borrower like GM needed to find a high risk saver willing to lend at appropriate yields. Now, GM's debt is bundled, maybe with other companies, and then chopped up so that grandma's savings can be used to purchase senior tranches which are much less risky than whole GM bonds.

The problem wasn't securitization or chopping up debt. It was that the tranches were mis-priced and mis-allocated. Turns out that not as much of the bundle can be treated as relatively safe. Instead of 92% of a bundle being AAA, more like 88% is or something like that. Once more data is collected, the system will work better, but one thing is for sure, we'll never go back to life without these tools. That would be stupid. Just because a madman like OJ Simpson used a knife to kill two people doesn't mean the rest of society will stop using knives. Securitization is here to stay and it's not a conspiracy or some trick. It's just a tool to allow savers to lend to borrowers

Friday, October 10, 2008

Securitization a Sound Method

No, securitization is a sound method. We can make AAA securities from subprime mortgages, just like we can filter clean water from a cesspool. The question is how much "clean" water we can get. Clearly not as much as the rating agencies thought.

Yes there is a problem with the agencies and how they operate. Government regulations give the agencies a huge amount of power. They can force a company into bankruptcy like what they did with Lehman by downgrading the bonds that they had initially graded AAA to junk. That forces Lehman to put up more capital in a vicious cycle of destruction. Yet the ratings agencies aren't punished for making huge and substantial mistakes. It doesn't matter how wrong they are or were, they get to continue on. Where is the incentive to be right? Where is the incentive to do their job?